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A jurisprudence of the limit 
ANNE ORFORD* 
Institutional and political developments since the end of the Cold War 
have led to a revival of public interest in questions of international law 
and cosmopolitan legality. This has intensified with the violent attacks on 
the US of 11 September 2001, and the use of force against the territory and 
people of Afghanistan and Iraq carried out in response. Many scholars in 
law and the humanities have embraced a cosmopolitan vision of the future 
of international law in answer to the sense of crisis which these events 
have precipitated. 1 Liberal international law is increasingly appealed to as 
offering a bulwark both against the threats posed by terrorists, religious 
militants, failed states, environmental degradation and epidemics, and 
against the excesses of the measures taken by states in response to these 
perceived threats. Commentators look to international law as a source of 
constraints on the abuses ofhegemonic power, as a means of responding 
to the threats posed to the state by terrorism and economic globalization, 
or as a field in which economic justice and global co-operation should 
be on the agenda. The international is imagined, for good or ill, as a space 
outside the order imposed by independent sovereign states - a space in 
which law, the state and the subject all reach their limits.2 The revival 
of interest in and anxiety about those limits is expressedJn .~he appeal 
to international law and by reference to imperialism, terrorism, human 
rights and the state of exception.3 
• Thanks to Hilary Charlesworth for discussions about the writing of this introduction, to 
Andrew Robertson and Peter Rush for their helpful comments on earlier drafts and to 
Megan Donaldson for her invaluable editorial assistance. 
1 See for example Zygmunt Bauman, Europe: An Unfinished Adventure (Cambridge, 2004); 
Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with ]llrgen Habermas and 
jacques Derrida (Chicago, 2003); Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness 
(London, 2001). 
2 Mark F. N. Franke, Global Limits: Immanuel Kant, International Relations, and Critique of 
World Politics (Albany, NY, 2001). 
3 R. B. J, Walker, 'International, Imperial, Exceptional' in ELISE Collective Volume, Counter-
Terrorism: Implications for the Liberal State in Europe (Brussels, 2005), pp. 36-57. 
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At the same time, the discipline of international law is itself undergoing 
one of its periodic crises, in which it attempts to renew itself and reassert 
its relevance.4 Dramatic changes seem daily to be proposed to existing 
international institutions and to legal doctrines relating to sovereignty, 
territory, responsibility and the use of force. This renewed public inter-
est in cosmopolitan legality, occurring at the same moment as a per-
ceived crisis of relevance for existing international law and institutions, 
offers a valuable opportunity. The questions to which international law 
is expected to offer an answer are some of the most important, vital and 
intriguing questions of our time. Yet international law as a discipline 
has lost its capacity to provide a compelling understanding of what is 
at stake when these questions arise. This collection is part of a broader 
movement seeking to regenerate the exchange between international law 
and the humanities in order to restore the ability of international)aw 
to address such questions more fully. It brings together scholars working 
in a range of critical traditions to contribute to the generation of an under-
standing of the stakes of the turn to international law in to day's political 
climate. 
The chapters in this book complicate the tendency to see international 
law as offering an answer to the questions generated by the war on terror, 
globalization and related events. Rather than look to international law or 
institutions for answers or as the source of a pre-packaged programme of 
reforms which can solve the problems of domestic politics, these essays 
explore international law as a record of attempts to think about what 
happens at the limit of modern political organization. Responding to the 
questions posed of international law requires understanding the forms 
that global governance takes today, and 'how the world has come to take 
this form'. 5 International law offers an archive of attempts to address the 
questions and solve the problems that arise under the conditions of a 
modern politics organized around territorial sovereignty. It provides a 
valuable history of the ways in which a politics imagined as involving 
encounters between independent, sovereign entities and a commitment 
to cosmopolitan ideals has materialized through specific practices, institu-
tions and relations. Many of the issues currently on the agenda of interna-
tional institutional reform- terrorism, human rights violations, civilian 
immunity, security, states of emergency, the responsibility to protect, 
4 Anne Orford, 'The Destiny of International Law' (2004) 17 Leiden Journal of Intemational 
Law441. 
5 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London, 2004), p. 8. 
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peace-building - are about the point at which we reach the limits of 
modern political organization. By bringing together theorists working on 
these issues from the perspective of history, political theory, philosophy 
and international law, this book explores what the turn to international 
law might mean, and what the archive of international law offers as a way 
of understanding the stakes of this politics. These theorists remind us that 
the war on terror, attended as it is by a sense of 'threats, challenges and 
change', is not exceptional. 6 International law guards the secret history of a 
modernity which is itself terrorized by the lack of any sovereign authority 
to guarantee the law or make sense of death. 
More specifically, this book is about the many forms of the relation 
to the other, as it is figured, performed, inscribed and imagined in the 
discipline of international law. To give this book the name International 
Law and its Others is immediately to invoke a critical project which has an 
established trajectory within international law. The well-versed reader of 
international legal texts, glancing at the title, might anticipate that this is 
a book which will describe and denounce the ways in which international 
law was complicit in, and founded upon, European imperialism. Such a 
book, being published as it is during an era of wars on terror, of develop-
ment rounds at the World Trade Organization, of an institutional language 
of threats and challenges at the United Nations, might be relied upon to 
demonstrate the continuities between imperialism in its classical form and 
imperialism lite (or not so lite) in Iraq and elsewhere in the twenty-first 
century. Ideally, it might be expected that some ofinternationallaw's 'oth-
ers' will be invited to speak within these pages, to give the perspective of the 
'native informant' on how the progress of international law should prop-
erly be measured, or to offer a description of what it is like to be an other of 
a law which imagines itself as international, even at times universal. There 
is a generous and liberal impulse within the mainstream of international 
law which wants the voice of the other to be heard, and which believes, in 
true cosmopolitan fashion, that we have now arrived at the moment when 
the truth of our history will finally be available to us. This book owes a great 
deal to this tradition of thinking critically about the need to reform inter-
national law to make it more inclusive and humane, and its authors take 
seriously the questions of responsibility that are posed by the history of 
imperialism. 
6 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of tile Secretary-Genera/'s High-Level 
Panel 011 Threats, Challenges and Change (2004). 
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Yet many of these chapters also depart from, and at times challenge, 
this mode of critical engagement. In particular, the authors writing here 
hesitate to name once and for all the inside and outside, the self and other 
of law, as if fearing that the other can only ever be represented by accom-
modating or assimilating it to existing economies, languages or practices. 
They attempt in a variety of ways to come to terms with the complicated 
and infinite process of constituting the self in relation to the other through 
the institutions of law and language. In these pages, sovereigns prolifer-
ate and take different forms, those addressed by the speech of law are 
figured and encountered in many ways, and the contingent and unstable 
meanings of legal texts are stabilized and take effect over the bodies and 
territories of those who are included in the community of international 
law only through their exclusion.7 This sense of the fragmentary nature 
of critique is a product of the challenge that imperialism poses to history. 
As Gayatri Spivak writes, 'the epistemic story of imperialism is the story 
of a series of interruptions, a repeated tearing out of time that cannot be 
sutured'.8 Writing about 'the other' after such a history can be one way of 
attempting to regain that which has been lost in the process. Yet, as Spivak 
adds, if'we are driven by a nostalgia for lost origins, we too run the risk of 
effacing the "native" and stepping forth as "the real Cali ban", of forgetting 
that he is a name in a play, an inaccessible blankness circumscribed by 
an interpretable text'.9 It is the task of interpreting the texts of law, rather 
than attempting to access the blankness which they circumscribe, with 
which these chapters are engaged. 
The themes which emerge from this book in terms of the relation 
between self and other include responsibility, desire and violence. Each 
of these themes addresses the conflict at the very interior of the subject, 
whether that subject be the liberal individual, the sovereign state or the 
discipline of international law. For one group of authors, the challenge 
posed by imperialism is to provide histories of the ways in which the other 
has been represented. They ask what has been done to the other who is 
figured in relation to sovereignty and imperialism. For a second group of 
authors, the 'other' of international law is that from which we set off or 
which we push away in order to constitute a subject, an institution or a 
tradition. 10 These chapters are concerned with how one might respond 
7 On the form oflaw which includes through exclusion, see Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life (trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, Stanford, 1998). 
8 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the 
Vanishing Present (Cambridge, MA, 1999), p. 208. 
9 Ibid., p. 118. 10 Ibid. 
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to the call of the wholly other understood in this sense. There is a quality 
to international law as a discipline that brings some of the anxiety or the 
excitement involved in this question of responsibility into sharp relief. For 
some of the authors, there is something about this relation to the other 
from which they take pleasure, or which drives their work. They bring 
together fragments from disparate traditions or engage across idioms, 
writing about texts and ideas taken from worlds that would name them-
selves as theory on the one hand and practice on-the other, and seeing 
how these texts open out when read together. Marjorie Garber describes 
the quality of this pleasure in terms of disciplinary libido. Garber says that 
this libido is that which keeps 'scholarly disciplines from becoming inert 
and settled'. 11 Each field differentiates itself but also desires to become 
its nearest neighbour, whether at the edges of the academy, among the 
disciplines, or within the disciplines. To quote David Kennedy, this is 'the 
disruptive edge of each discipline vibrating excitedly with the other'. 12 For 
others, this engagement with the other of law is also disturbing. Many of 
the chapters use the language of responsibility and ethics to develop the 
sense of the other as posing a question which the subject cannot answer. 
For scholars faced with the horrors of the war on terror, of detention of 
asylum-seekers, of suspension oflaw in the name of security or national 
interest, this sense of responsibility gives rise to an anxiety about the 
irrelevance of scholarship and the academic role. The terms in which we 
might once have thought about this academic responsibility are in flux. 
As Antony Anghie writes in his concluding chapter: 
The question of what role should be played by the scholar, or, more partic-
ularly, the international law scholar and adviser, is a very old and complex 
one. But, clearly, profound changes have occurred. The traditional divi-
sions and debates, between 'realists' and 'pragmatists' and the 'crits', seem 
in retrospect to have been based on a curiously secure intellectual order, one 
in which, whatever the divisions, certain shared assumptions were main-
tained. The older verities that bound together the members of the 'invisible 
college of international lawyers', in Oscar Schachter's memorable phrase, 
no longer obtain. 13 
This sense of the relationship between 'older verities' and the grounds 
of critique can be seen in an earlier exchange between a sovereign and 
11 Marjorie Garber, Academic Instincts (Princeton, 2001}, p. ix. 
12 David Kennedy, 'Law's Literature' in Marjorie Garber, Rebecca L. Walkowitz and Paul 
B. Franklin (eds.), Field Work (New York, 1996), pp. 207-13 at p. 212. 
13 Antony Anghie, 'On critique and the other', pp. 389-400 at p. 397 (reference omitted). 
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an errant philosopher. In the preface to The Conflict of the Faculties, 
Immanuel Kant cites a letter that he received from the King of Prus-
sia, Friedrich Wilhelm, reproaching Kant for abusing his philosophy and 
deforming and debasing certain dogmas in his book, Religion within the 
Limits of Reaso-n Alone. Wilhelm accused Kant of failing two responsibili-
ties. The first was his 'inner responsibility and personal duty as a teacher 
of the young'. The second was his responsibility to 'the father of the land, 
to the sovereign, whose intentions are known to him and ought to define 
the law'. 14 Kant quoted from the letter as follows: 
You must recognize how irresponsibly you thus act against your duty as a 
teacher of the young and against our sovereign purposes, which you know 
well. Of you we require a most scrupulous account and expect, so as to 
avoid our highest displeasure, that in the future you will not fall into such 
error, t:ut rather will, as befits your duty, put your reputation and talent 
to the better use of better realizing our sovereign purpose; failing this, you 
can expect unpleasant measures for your continuing obstinacy. 15 
Discussing this passage, Jacques Derrida comments: 
[T]he nostalgia that some of us may feel in the face of this situation perhaps 
derives from this value of responsibility: at least one could believe, at that 
time, that responsibility was to be taken- for something, and before some 
determinable someone. One could at least pretend to know whom one was 
addressing, and where to situate power; a debate on the topics of teaching, 
knowledge, and philosophy could at least be posed in terms of responsibility. 
The instances invoked - the State, the sovereign, the people, knowledge, 
action, truth, the university- held a place in discourse that was guaranteed, 
decidable, and in every sense of this word, 'representable' ... Could we say 
as much today? Could we agree to debate together about the responsibility 
proper to the university? 16 
The institution of international law is intimately concerned with these 
notions of the State, the sovereign, the people, action and truth, and so 
repeatedly brings us up against the challenge which Derrida here artic-
ulates. These chapters explore the relations between the inside and the 
outside of the university, between the critic and the practitioner. They 
detail the hopes that generations oflawyers and scholars have had for their 
engagement with others- women, civilians, decision-makers, sovereigns, 
14 Jacques Derrida, 'Mochlos, or The Eyes of the Faculty' (trans. Richard Rand and Amy 
Wygant) in Jacques Derrida, Eyes of the University (Stanford, 2004), pp. 83-112 at p. 86. 
15 As quoted in ibid., pp. 86-7 (translation notes omitted). 16 Ibid., p. 87. 
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imperial administrators, indigenous peoples, savages, nature, power, his-
tory, masculinity and war. They detail the anxieties that lawyers have felt 
when their work seemed irrelevant to those outside the discipline or the 
academy. Throughout, they read the texts of international law as a con-
centrated and charged record of the ways in which scholars, bureaucrats, 
decision-makers and legal professionals write about relations to the other 
and about what happens at the limits of the spatial and temporal ordering 
upon which international law depends. The resulting exploration of the 
relation between critique, the other and responsibility offers a rich array 
of responses to the question of what it means to speak and write about 
international law in our time. 
Part 1: Sovereignty otherwise 
[W]e were still awaiting a response, as if such a response would help us 
not only think otherwise but also to read what we thought we had already 
read ... 17 
One way in which a sense of international law as a jurisprudence of the 
limit emerges is through exploring the centrality of the conception of 
the sovereign state to the discipline. The chapters in Part I challenge the 
well-rehearsed disciplinary history of sovereignty, one of progress from 
religious absolutism to secular rationalism. The moment of seculariza-
tion in these narratives is usually figured by the Peace of Westphalia in 
1648. In this account, Westphalia marks a clean break between the social 
formations of Christendom and their successors- the sovereign indepen-
dent states of modern tit.nes. According to international law, one of the 
essential elements of statehood is territorial sovereignty - the idea tha:t 
-within its territory 'supreme authority is vested in the state'. 18 
·- The idea that the medieval international system was transformed at a 
particular point in history into a system of modern sovereign states, each 
with an effective government exercising exclusive and absolute control 
over territory and people, is difficult to sustain when we look to those 
decisions of international arbitrators and tribunals concerned with com-
peting claims to sovereignty over territory. The archive of empire offered 
by international law suggests the implausibility of a version of history in 
which a stable and uniform mode of political organization named the 
17 Jacques Derrida, The Work of Mourning (ed. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, 
Chicago, 2001), p. 206. 
18 LA. Shearer, Starke's International Law (11th ed., London, 1994), p. 144. 
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modern State emerged in 1648. The cases that develop the norms gov-
erning traditional modes of acquisition of territory reiterate the notion 
tliat the effectiveness of occupation as a mode of acquisition depends not 
only upon making known in a public, clear and precise manner the inten-
tion to consider a particular piece of earth as the territory of a sovereign, 
but that this must be accompanied by an effective exercise of control. 
International law, in an oft-cited formulation, does not 'reduce a right 
such as territorial sovereignty, with which almost all international rela-
tions are bound up, to the category of an abstract right, without concrete 
manifestations'. 19 This phrasing has become iconic in international legal 
doctrine, raising the question of how we might account for this compul-
sion repeatedly to invoke such a vision of sovereignty. While the reiteration 
of effective control in such decisions operates to support the ideal-type of 
the sovereign as all-powerful, effectively controlling territory and poten-
tially able to kill, starve, exploit, imprison and subordinate those .within 
it, the image of the European sovereign that emerges if we look at the facts 
grounding successful claims to territory in the texts of international law 
is a far smaller, more absurd and ridiculous figure. Paying attention to 
the record of what counted as a 'concrete manifestation' of control over 
territory reveals that 'effective control' often meant very little in practice. 
Europeans had to provide only limited evidence of control, often in the 
form of some kind of writing or speech, in order to be recognized as 
sovereign over a territory.20 The declaration of a French lieutenant on 
board a commercial vessel cruising past an island in the Pacific that the 
island was owned by France and the publication of this declaration in a 
Hawaiian journal,21 the signing of a contract on the part of Dutch East 
India company officials,22 and the passing of legislation in relation to a 
territory,23 have all been treated as relevant evidence of effective occu-
pation. Only a powerful fantasy could support the use of such concrete 
manifestations of sovereignty to demonstrate that the sovereign state is 
a form of political organization which in fact depends upon exclusive 
19 Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States) {1928) 2 RIAA 829 at 839 ('Island of 
Palmas Case'). 
20 In contrast, non-Europeans were rarely able to satisfy the demand that they manifest 
sovereign cont.rol. See Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of Inter-
national Law (Cambridge, 2005). 
21 Clipperton Island Arbitration (Mexicov. France) {1931) 2 RIAA 1105; translation in {1932) 
26 American Journal of International Law 390. 
22 Island of Palm as Case. 
23 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Norwayv. Denmark) {1933) PCIJ Rep (Ser. A/B) No. 53 
('Eastern Greenland Case'). 
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jurisdiction over fixed territory and effective control over the inhabitants 
of that territory. 
Recent accounts in political theory have also begun to complicate the 
history of modern politics as one in which the sovereign state emerged 
in Europe in the seventeenth century as a stable entity exercising control 
over territory and people.24 Similarly, philosophers have begun to ask 
whether and how sovereignty makes sense as a concept across time and 
·· space, and whether there are alternative ways ofimagining sovereignty that 
may have been lost in the rush to celebrate or bemoan the omnipotent 
sovereign of liberal imagination. The chapters· inc· Part" I draw on these 
contemporary developments in philosophy, legal history and political 
theory in order to think sovereignty otherwise. They put into play relations 
between sovereignty, speech, performance and flesh. For these authors, the 
critical project involves the strategic rewriting of histories of sovereignty. 
They put historical knowledge to work 'not to refute, but to eliminate and 
render impossible' particular theoretical and political strategies.25 In so 
doing, each attempts to shift the focus 'on to something else which [offers 
us] more options, more places to go'.26 
Costas Douzinas explores whether and how sovereignty- in its mod-
ern form as indivisible, unconditional and absolute - continues to make 
sense and take effect in the world. For Douzinas, this political form of 
sovereignty is under attack, an attack that is rather more to be feared 
than to be welcomed. His concern about the political effects of the 
retreat of sovereignty derives from an understanding of the ways in which 
sovereignty as a metaphysical concept relates to contemporary forms of 
political organization. Like Carl Schmitt, Douzinas sees the modern polit-
ical form of sovereignty as a secularized version of a theological concept. 
However, unlike Schmitt, Douzinas understands this theological form of 
sovereignty as uncertain, and it is here that he finds room for optimism. 
This sense of the uncertain nature of theological sovereignty derives from 
a rigorous jurisprudential analysis of the foundations of that sovereign 
form. For Douzinas, sovereignty is the name given to the event of coming 
together or self-constitution of a community in and through jurisdiction, 
24 For example Ben no Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Interna-
tional Relations (London, 2004); Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: 
State-Building and Extra-Territorial Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, 1994). 
25 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France (trans. David 
Macey, London, 2003), p. 98. 
26 Jacqueline Rose, On Not Being Able to Sleep: Psychoanalysis and the Modern World (London, 
2004), p. 29. 
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the speaking oflaw. In the form of bare sovereignty, this coming together is 
a potentially infinite process. It involves a spatial ordering, a proper name, 
an institutional ordering and, in its democratic mode, a mutual address. 
This bare sovereignty is transformed into theological sovereignty through 
the inauguration of law through words. The law must be spoken in order 
to exist, and it is because this is so, 'because the law must have a mouth 
and a body', that the unique individuals and the great legislators 'enter the 
stage'. 27 Yet, while these legislators (or dictators) speak the law, they do so 
in the name of some 'silent partner for whom they speak, God, King, the 
People or Law'. 28 The particular and the universal are brought together 
through the saying of law. Here we see emerging the 'theologico-political 
form of sovereignty', the transformation of bare sovereignty into 'the def-
inite figure of a Sovereign'.29 This is the modern all-powerful sovereign 
feared or celebrated in much modern political philosophy, the sovereign 
who decides tile exception, goes to war, abandons his subjects and anni-
hilates his enemies. The secularization of sovereignty in modern democ-
racies does nothing to render this figure any less terrible. While the One 
and Only God is no longer imagined as the source of sovereignty, the 
place of power does not remain empty- instead the 'people' are 'but one 
further link in the chain of substitutions of the metaphysical principle of 
the One'.30 However, it is the space between the particular...and the uni-
versal, bare and theological sovereignty, which for Douzinas offers hope, 
as it renders the 'particular claim to state a universal law ... always an 
uncertain claim'.31 It is because this claim can fail, because the particular 
and the universal can be seen as two moments which are not necessarily 
connected, that both violence and critique are possible.32 Thus Douzi-
nas might agree with Schmitt that 'whether the extreme exception can 
be banished from the world is not a juristic question',33 and indeed both 
Douzinas and Schmitt seem to suggest that the modern constitutional 
attempt to eliminate the sovereign in this sense is doomed to failure. Yet 
Douzinas insists that this is not necessarily bad news - the bounded and 
uncertain claims of sovereignty are to be preferred to a politics ofhuman-
itywith 'no foundation and no ends'.34 He leaves us with the possibility of 
a political theology which gives some hope for the future. While the vision 
27 Costas Douzinas, 'Speaking law: on bare theological and cosmopolitan sovereignty', 
pp. 35-56 at pp. 43-4. 
28 Ibid., p. 46. 29 Ibid., p. 47. 30 Ibid., p. 48. 31 Ibid., p. 52. 32 Ibid. 
33 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters 011 the Concept of Sovereignty (trans. George 
Schwab, Cambridge, MA, 1988), p. 7. 
34 Douzinas, 'Speaking law', p. 55. 
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of sovereignty which emerges in reading this chapter is not the theological 
sovereignty of the all-powerful, One and Only God, it is still graced by 
the divine. It resonates with the vision with which Jacques Derrida closes 
his meditation on the end of sovereignty: 
[W]herever the name of God would allow us to think something else, for 
example a vulnerable nonsovereignty, one that suffers and is divisible, one 
that is mortal even, capable of contradicting itself or repenting (a thought 
that is neither impossible nor without example), it would be a completely 
different story, perhaps even the story of a god who deconstructs himself.35 
Ian Duncanson is also concerned to explore how the reiteration of 
an indivisible, all-powerful sovereign state which so dazzles, comforts, 
seduces and terrorizes might be resisted. For Duncanson, English legal and 
political history offers a se9ret history of sovereignty, one quite different 
to the Hobbesian conception of a world without Leviathan. In a close 
reading of the documents of post-Glorious Revolution England, which 
he admits is an unlikely place to begin to look for a peaceful account of 
the sovereign, Duncanson finds a version of sovereignty constrained by 
practices of politeness, education, manners, conversation and scepticism. 
This version of sovereignty was a hard-won response to the lessons learnt 
by the bourgeois English both from internal challenges (religious divisions 
and the threat of the newly politicized labouring poor) and from imperial 
misadventures (including in Ireland and later America). It was only with 
the imperial ambitions of the nineteenth century in India that the vision of 
sovereignty as absolute and omnipotent took hold. Later writers about law 
in the tradition of Bentham, Austin, Dicey and Hart forget the connection 
of the grandeur of sovereignty with what constituted its authority- the 
lesson taught by Locke, Shaftesbury, Hume and Burke. Thus Duncanson 
follows Benno Teschke in suggesting that we have been captured for too 
long by the myth of 1648. Duncanson spells out the implications of this 
rewriting ofhistory for international lawyers currently faced with renewed 
claims about the priority of a certain vision of sovereignty as a basis 
for reformulations of international norms relating to use of force, the 
responsibility to protect and so on. Those jurists who continue to offer us 
the 'secular version of something like the Stuart constitution' serve 'the 
performative function, not only in academe, but in the media, politics 
and public life in general, of reducing the citizen to a subject at risk 
35 Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays Oil Reason (trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael 
Naas, Stanford, 2005), p. 157. 
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of Hart's slaughterhouse'.36 This suggests a different way to think about 
the responsibility of those writing about international relations - to the 
extent we write and behave 'as if the sovereign were all-powerful, we 
participate in making it so. International lawyers memorialize a certain 
set of knowledges and practices, which place the sovereign state at the 
foreground of the law, and a certain group of actors as principal law-
-makers. In his lectures published a,s Society Must Be Defended, Michel 
Foucault explores the 'memorialization function' performed by the work 
of state historians, 'from the first Roman annalists until the late Middle 
Ages'.37 Foucault suggests: 
The annalists' practice of permanently recording history also serves to rein-
force power. It too is a sort of ritual of power; it shows that what sovereigns 
and kings do is never pointless, futile or petty, and never unworthy of being 
narrated. Everything they do can be, and deserves to be, spoken of and 
must be remembered in perpetuity, which means that the slightest deed 
or action of a king can and must be turned into a dazzling action and an 
exploit. At the same time, each of his decisions is inscribed in a sort of law 
' for his subjects, and an obligation for his successors.38 
Thus when international lawyers record the deeds, actions or decisions 
of sovereigns they in turn inscribe a 'sort of law' for subjects, as well as 
an obligation for those who are successors to the sovereigns of Europe. 
Duncanson's rewriting of English legal history suggests how international 
lawyers might approach this process of inscription differently, and shift 
_!he ways in which they represent the international. 
The idea of changing the practice of inscription is taken up in the chap-
ter by Dan Danielsen. Corporations, and mercantile entities before them, 
have disturbed and depended upon the categories of international law for 
centuries. Doctrines such as state responsibility- a regime for the protec-
tion and preservation of the private property of foreign investors in the 
face of upheavals such as decolonization, civil wars, revolutions or regime 
change- reveal the functional separation of politics and economics, which 
works to define the functions of a state over which the sovereign has exclu-
sive jurisdiction. The functions of the state as they emerged in Europe 
were largely political, and the fundamental distinction between 'politi-
cal possession of territory and economic ownership' meant that much of 
international law worked to ensure 'that even the enemy's property rights 
36 Ian Duncanson, 'Law as conversation', pp. 57-84 at p. 83. 
37 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p. 66. 38 Ibid., p. 67. 
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were protected'. 39 Danielsen seeks to challenge the effects of this separa-
tion of the political from the economic. He points to the fact that, while 
international lawyers have long sought to account for the role played by 
corporations in global governance, international law has tended to treat 
such actors as subjects for regulation or as an influence on regulation. 
Yet international lawyers have not treated corporations as producers of 
law or as 'governance institutions', perhaps out of a desire to preserve the 
nation-state as uniquely sovereign. Danielsen argues that corporations in 
fact perform regulatory functions, that corporate governance laws have a 
quasi-constitutional status, and that international lawyers should begin 
to treat corporations as agents of law, rather than assuming that inter-
national or transnational law always emanates from the state. According 
to Danielsen, we need to 'map the decisions of corporate actors with the 
same attention, specificity and rigour that international lawyers and aca-
demics have applied to state activity'.40 This mapping would produce a 
new kind of law and a new kind of sovereign- the corporation. Danielsen 
moves towards making corporate decision-makers responsible for their 
• decisions and institutional planning by treating these practices as a source 
oflaw and thus potentially making them opposable and generalizable. His 
proposal that we map these actions, that we treat what these actors do as 
'never unworthy of being narrated',41 gives to their deeds a new weight. 
The chapter by Connal Parsley is a reminder of the political stakes of this 
question of the writing of sovereignty. Parsley explores the performance 
of sovereignty through the acts of those who speak the law, by attending 
with great care to the meanings made of one sign across time and space. 
The sign is a thumbprint appearing on an administrative form, by which 
Topsy Kundrilba was found by an Australian judge to have consented to the 
removal of her son (aged seven years) by the Director of Native Affairs in 
19 56. The form was written in English (a language which Topsy Kundrilba 
did not speak) and spoke of her 'desire' that her son, 'a part European-
blood, his father being a European', be 'educated and trained in accordance 
with accepted European standards'.42 The litigation during which this 
sign was used again to mark the sovereignty of Anglo-Australia was one 
of an ongoing series of legal actions by which indigenous Australians 
39 Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and 
West (Cambridge, 2002), p. 15. 
40 Dan Danielsen, 'Corporate power and global order', pp. 85-99 at p. 98. 
41 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p. 66. 
42 As quoted in Connal Parsley, 'Seasons in the abyss: reading the void in Cubillo', pp. 100-127 
at p. 104. 
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have sought recognition of the harms done to the 'stolen generation' of 
children forcibly removed by the stateY Parsley reflects upon the refusal 
of the judge in this case, O'Loughlin J, to consider the non-documentary 
evidence suggesting that the thumbprint did not signify the will or consent 
of Topsy Kundrilba to the removal of her son. He argues that the decision 
byO'Loughlin J that the thumbprint signified consent, and his privileging 
of the consequent meaning of the form over oral evidence relating to the 
conditions surrounding the production of the form, is an emblematic 
instance of the performance of sovereignty. This performance depends 
upon the idea of a natural writing capable of conveying a full and perfect 
meaning, and upon an image of the sovereign subject who writes. The 
T of the form of consent is its sovereign, or in the words of Shoshana 
Felman, 'the authority of the performative is nothing other than that of 
the~fifst person'.44 Parsley draws on the work of Giorgio Agamben and 
Jacques Derrida to argue that this invocation of a subject who writes 
erases the institutional conditions by which the form seeks to interpellate 
those it addresses. For Parsley, this erasure is emblematic of the logic 
of sovereignty. In the moment of decision, O'Loughlin J performs as 
sovereign by inscribing consent as a fact within his judgment, while at the 
same time refusing to acknowledge his responsibility in writing the facts 
oflaw and thus determining the fate of the indigenous claimants.45 Yet, as 
Parsley shows, the law cannot ever fully secure its own interpretation. Like 
the thumbprint of Topsy Kundrilba, the judgment of O'Loughlin J is also 
'broken from its context, engendering a new possibility'.46 The world of 
speech we inhabit as lawyers or scholars opens out through the practices 
of reiteration, giving flesh to the words of others, often in community but 
also in the silence of our solitary reading (in the office, at a cafe, under 
the blanket). Our reading, no less than our writing, is bound up with the 
political theology of modern sovereignty. 
43 According to the Bringing Them Home report into this history, which was released in April 
1997, 'between one in three and one in ten Indigenous children were forcibly removed 
from their families and communities in the period from approximately 1910 until 1970. In 
certain regions and in certain periods the figure was undoubtedly much greater than one 
in ten. In that time not one Indigenous family has escaped the effects of forcible removal': 
see Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Bringing Them Home: National 
Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Childrm from Their 
Families (Canberra, 1997), p. 37. 
44 Shoshana Felman, The Scandal of the Speaking Body (Stanford, 2003}, p. 33. 
45 On the inability of law to understand itself as writing, see Nina Philadelphoff-Pur en and 
Peter Rush, 'Fatal (F}laws: Law, Literature and Writing' (2003) 14 Law and Critique 191 at 
202. 
46 Parsley, 'Seasons in the abyss', p. 101. 
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Part II: Human rights and other values 
International law as a regime that recognizes certain kinds of actors as 
sovereign produces a world of legitimate violence which is territorially-
bounded. International law, through the institutionalization of human 
rights, also produces the techniques by which the law attempts to mediate 
that violence. In the words of Rob Walker, '[c]laims about the sovereignty 
of states ... replace the angels as a marker of the margins of human 
existence'.47 It is the question of what happens at the margins that absorbs 
international human rights lawyers. International human rights law is the 
field in which international lawyers and others try to make sense of the 
ways- that modern states grasp human life as a project and a problem. 
It is also the vehicle through which many lawyers and activists attempt 
to constrain the power exercised by states over the individuals within 
their territory or jurisdiction. The understanding of power which informs 
this legal tradition is largely that which Michel Foucault has described as 
juridical or sovereign power- power understood as a commodity held by a 
sovereign and dependent upon control over the earth and its products. Yet 
human rights law is increasingly resorted to as part of a struggle against 
the globalization of disciplinary or bio-power, a mechanism of power 
exercised through bodies and what they do. This is most visible in the 
engagement of the human rights community with the American treatment 
of detainees as part of the war on terror, and with the related detention of 
asylum-seekers in Australia as part of an Australian immigration control 
policy seeking to deter 'economic refugees'. In other words, lawyers invoke 
~uman rights when confronted with the fate of human beings who are 
abandoned by the law of the sovereign state - included as subjects of 
law only by being excluded from the community to which the law gives 
rise. The authors of the chapters in Part II ask whether human rights 
offer a mode of resistance for the subject- a way of resisting modernity's 
'hounding of the subject beyond death, apparently without limit'48 - or 
whether instead the invocation of human rights constrains our capacity 
to think about and counter the ways in which power circulates in this 
global politics and economy. They show that, in order to understand the 
place of international human rights law in the modern global political 
47 R. B. J. Walker, 'From International Relations to World Politics' in Joseph A. Camilleri, 
Anthony P. Jarvis and Albert J. Paolini (eds.), The State ill Transition: Reimagining Political 
Space (Boulder, 1995), pp. 21-38 at p. 28. 
48 Joan Copjec, Imagine There's No Woman: Ethics and Sublimation (Cambridge, 2002), 
p. 47. 
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order, it is necessary to explore and reconfigure the historical relationship 
between human rights, economics and security. 
The chapter by David Kennedy explores what happens when human-
itarian values are successfully 'transformed into legal and institutional 
projects'.49 Kennedy argues that American humanitarians find it dif-
ficult to acknowledge their participation in rulership, despite the fact 
that human rights as a vocabulary and a tool is now used not only by 
human rights activists and NGOs, but by militaries, corporations and 
trade lawyers. For Kennedy, one of the major challenges facing the human 
rights movement in the years ahead is to learn to be more 'responsible 
partners in governance'- coming to terms with the power that humani-
tarians now exercise and taking responsibility for the costs of that power. 50 
Being attentive to the costs of human rights work requires focusing on its 
everyday routines rather than the more spectacular aspects of interven-
tion, and facing squarely the choices that have to be made in the process 
of ruling or governing. Central to Kennedy's argument is the relation-
ship between responsibility and pragmatic calculation. To be responsible 
means to 'become more pragmatic' and 'to acknowledge and take respon-
sibility for the costs as well as the benefits of [our] work.' 51 Responsibility 
also requires accepting the limits to calculation and thus the freedom 
and power inherent in the moment of decision. According to Kennedy, 
human rights law offers a false promise that 'it knows what justice means, 
always and for everyone; all you need to do is adopt, implement and inter-
pret these rights'. 52 Kennedy resists this vision of the decision-maker or 
ruler as implementer of a programme or the act of decision as merely the 
application of a law. He focuses instead on the freedom experienced by 
the decision-maker, as the subject who pre-exists the decision. 53 This is a 
subject who is 'capable of deciding, in its "thinking and reasoning" way, 
what s/he wants, and whether or not to conform to the rules laid down 
before it and for it' (or to know when there are no such rules).54 For the 
decision-maker to do justice requires the exercise ofhuman freedom- this 
in turn requires that he or she find space amongst rules and institutions 
49 David Kennedy, 'Reassessing international humanitarianism: the dark sides', pp. 131-55 
atp.13l. 
50 Ibid., p. 132. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid., p. 134. 
53 For an articulation of a different view, that 'it is through the decision that one becomes 
a subject who decides something' and that 'if there is a decision, it presupposes that the 
subject of the decision does not yet exist', see Jacques Derrida, 'Remarks on Deconstruction 
and Pragmatism' in Chantal Mouffe ( ed.), Deconstruction and Pragmatism (London, 1996), 
pp. 77-88 at p. 84. 
54 Rachel Bowlby, Shopping with Freud (London, 1993), p. 82. 
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in which to discover 'opportunities for political engagement'. 55 Kennedy's 
closing paragraph conveys eloquently this vision of the relationship 
between freedom, responsibility and decision. 
There is freedom here- the freedom of discretion, of deciding in the excep-
tion, a human freedom of the will. It is at once pleasurable and terrifying. It 
entails responsibility to decide for others, causing consequences that elude 
our knowledge but not our power. 56 
My chapter also engages with the themes of responsibility and deci-
sion. While Kennedy calls for more pragmatism and for a clearer sense 
of the choices involved in the moment of decision, I argue that to decide 
is not simply to be outside the constraints of a pre-existing code or 'law 
as answer machine'. 57 Rather, at the moment of decision, the decision-
maker is both bound by a code and called to respond to the wholly other. 
In other words, the decision-maker is 'not only fragmented but irretriev-
ably split', 58 not just faced with 'a difficult and unsettling choice' but faced 
with 'an insoluble and paradoxical contradiction' between the demands 
of general accountability and absolute responsibility. 59 The chapter devel-
ops this idea through an exploration of the sacrificial tradition of think-
ing about responsibility. It begins with the biblical story of Abraham, of 
whom God demands that he offer his son Isaac as a sacrifice, and traces 
the meanings of this story for Christianity and for international poli-
tics.60 Sacrificial responsibility involves a singular relationship with the 
absolute other. In the Christian tradition, this other is named God, but 
in the tradition of international economic law with which this chapter 
is concerned, we might name this other 'the Market'. Responsibility in 
this tradition describes the split relationship of an individual to the pub-
lic world of universal principles, and to the unknown other to whose 
demands the individual must respond in secret. The madness of decision 
lies in this split between the need to hold universal principles, and the 
call to betray those principles in response to the sacrificial demand of 
55 Kennedy, 'Reassessing international humanitarianism', p. 151. 
56 Ibid., p. 155. 
57 David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism 
(Princeton, 2004), p. 318. 
58 Jenny Edkins and Veronique Pin-Fat, 'The Subject of the Political' in Jenny Edkins, Nalini 
Persram and Veronique Pin-Fat, Sovereignty and Subjectivity (Boulder, 1999), pp. 1-18 at 
p.l. 
59 Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death (trans. David Wills, Chicago, 1995 ), p. 61. 
60 While a version of this story appears in the religions of Judaism, Islam and Christianity, I 
trace the Christian form of the story, with its strongly economic logic. 
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the absolute other. Responsibility in this sense involves a relationship to 
the other to whom we respond (or submit), to whom we are responsible. 
This 'form of involvement with the other ... is a venture into absolute 
risk, beyond knowledge and certainty'.61 This answer or responsibility 
is not something that can easily be generalized or universalized. When 
we respond to the other, we must betray all the other others while at 
the same time reaffirming the code which binds us to them. In making 
the decision to answer the call of the absolute other, we can only ever 
be responsible to the one who makes the demand. This chapter traces the 
ways in which WTO agreements structure this responsibility so that the 
market becomes the singular other whose demand is to be answered by 
decision-makers.62 It is the global market to whom the decision-maker 
must be responsible in this sense. This economy of sacrifice is accompa-
nied by the promise of the reward of the righteous in the future by the 
Father (God/Market) who sees in secret.63 WTO agreements require that 
the decision-maker imagine himself or herself in the position of Abra-
ham, called to abandon public obligations (the familial tie to his son and 
wife for Abraham, the civic obligations to citizens and to values of trans-
parency in the case of the decision-maker) to meet these demands of the 
market in the expectation of a reward in the future. This chapter asks: can 
such decision-makers be responsible (rather than simply 'accountable') 
to those they sacrifice in such an economy? Does the appeal to human 
rights or democratic governance offer a means of countering the demands 
of the market? Can the law repay the debts owed to those figures whose 
sacrifices remain outside the economy of risk and reward that these texts 
establish? 
In her chapter, Judith Grbich takes up the concepts of sacrifice, aban-
donment and the fetish to pursue 'the processes of messianic economies 
which circulate as globalization and international finance law'.64 Her writ-
ing opens up new possibilities and avenues for research into the relation-
ship between human rights and trade, or blood and debt. This chapter is 
61 Derrida, Gift of Death, pp. S-6. 
62 In thinking about international economic law as political theology, I am influenced by 
Jennifer Beard, 'Understanding International Development Programs as a Modern Phe-
nomenon of Early and Medieval Christian Theology' (2003) 18 Australian Feminist Law 
]ouma/27, and Judith E. Grbich, 'Aesthetics in Christian Juridico-Theological Tracts: The 
Wanderings of Faith and Nomos' (2000} 12 Intemational Journal for the Semiotics of Law 
351. 
63 On the reward of the righteous, see Matthew 10:34-40 (Revised Standard Version). 
64 Judith Grbich, 'Secrets of the fetish in international law's messianism', pp. 197-220 at 
p. 206. 
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part of a body of work in which Grbich explores the 'theological archive 
and the political economy archive' of European modernity.65 Here, she 
builds on that work to develop a powerful enquiry into the futures of 
international law. Grbich argues that international lawyers are increas-
ingly called upon to legitimize the excess of power.66 It is in response 
to this impossible demand that some within the discipline have engaged 
with the messianic logic of international law, in an attempt to preserve 
'some hope for a future'. Grbich uses this work as a starting point to begin 
to trace the intimate relationship between Christian forms of messianic 
thought and international law. In particular, Grbich attends to the poet-
ics of international finance law, a key site for understanding the ways in 
which the image of other people's suffering has become linked in Western 
culture to 'the calculation of nation and value'. She suggests that, while 
she finds the work of Giorgio Agamben problematic, the intense sense 
of familiarity or uncanniness with which many readers respond to his 
theorization of abandonment comes in part from its relation to financial 
practices. The 'monied things of international finance law' are imagined 
as having authority to hold and measure financial entities, while the 'bare 
life' of the human being is banned from this domain, and 'abandoned 
to life at risk of death'.67 Grbich draws on the linkage of the themes of 
abandoned being and of the 'secrets of the fetish' in the work of]ean-Luc 
Nancy,68 to suggest ways in which we might understand the relation-
ship between sovereignty, global monetary economics and bare life. Her 
engagement with the genealogies of fetish writings of Europeans in the 
sixteenth to nineteenth centuries builds on the work of William Pietz, 
who has attended to the material practices and economic logics which 
produced the European discourse on fetishism later taken up famously by 
Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. According to Pietz, much European writ-
ing on fetishism forgets the 'economic explanation of fetishism found in 
the travel accounts that provided the factual evidence for Enlightenment 
65 Judith Grbich, 'The Problem of the Fetish in Law, History and Postcolonial Theory' (2003) 
7 Law Text Culture 43 at 61. See also Judith Grbich, 'Tracing the Figure of the Native in 
Postcolonial Theory and Native Title Law: Enlightenment, Aesthetics and Charles Harpur' 
(2005) 22 Australian Feminist Law ]ourna/127 at 144, exploring the effects of the 'freezing 
of the symbolics of property and propriety in European aesthetic productions over the 
whole of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The nineteenth century theorizing of 
law as separate from morals is almost the end of this cultural process, rather than its 
beginning.' 
66 Grbich, 'Secrets of the fetish', p. 197. 67 Ibid., pp. 198, 218. 
68 Jean-Luc Nancy, 'The Two Secrets of the Fetish' (trans. Thomas C. Platt) (200 1) 3 Diacritics 
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theories of primitive religion'.69 These travel accounts were part of a colo-
nial practice of engagement between European traders and West African 
societies. One of the most authoritative texts on African fetishism for 
European intellectuals was written by a Dutch West Indies Company offi-
cial and trader, Willem Bosman.7° Bosman was '[v]ery much the intel-
lectual offspring of Grotius' and a believer in 'the universality not of any 
religion but of the "Law ofNations"'.71 Grbich reads Bosman's text, and 
the eighteenth-century Dutch travel genre more generally, as generating 
moral fables, through which metropolitan readers were able to resolve 
the discomfort experienced as a result of the shifting credit forms and 
money practices then emerging in the Dutch republic. The anxieties gen-
erated by these practices, and the uncertainties produced by the colonial 
encounters with peoples who valued material objects in different ways, 
were soothed through the generation of travel accounts which disavowed 
the spiritual practices of those characterized as outsiders and explained 
Dutch credit practices in the language of Christian atonement and sacri-
fice. For Grbich, these 'secrets of the fetish' are guarded by international 
financial law and international humanitarianism. She draws on the recent 
work of Nancy, Agamben and Taubes on fetishism, messianism and aban-
donment to suggest possible directions for critical theorists seeking to find 
within the messianic tradition of international law the resources to begin 
again. 
The chapter by Florian Hoffmann offers a response to the critics of 
human rights. It is addressed to the human rights activist, a figure who 
is uncertain as to the ground from which action is possible. This figure 
stands in the midst of critique. On the one hand are the critics who say that 
the human rights movement is part of the problem, and when the activist 
looks at the occupation oflraq or the intervention in Kosovo or the good 
governance agenda of the World Bank, he or she thinks, well, maybe the 
critics are right. On the other hand, the centrality ofhuman rights is under 
attack as security becomes the new universal in international law, through 
which the subjects of international law must speak in order to articulate 
their needs, desires and interests, and as human rights are increasingly cur-
tailed in the name of counter-terrorism. After the post-Wittgensteinian 
and poststructuralist challenges to the plausibility of universal rationality, 
the activist has no firm foundations on which to base the certainty that 
69 William Pietz, 'The Fetish of Civilization: Sacrificial Blood and Monetary Debt' in Peter Pels 
and Oscar Salem ink ( eds.), Colonial Subjects: Essays on the Practical History of Anthropology 
(Ann Arbor, 1999), pp. 53-81 at p. 60. 
70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 
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human rights provides a justification for action. To all of this, Hoffmann 
replies- human rights can and should motivate action on behalf of such a 
person. Yet the activist cannot simply rely upon the accounts produced by 
human rights institutions and professionals, according to which human 
rights are legally valid, universal and indivisible. Nor can the activist seek 
to avoid the critical challenge to notions of universal rationality and the 
commensurability of language and culture. Hoffmann suggests that the 
pragmatism of Richard Rorty provides part of the answer. For Rorty, con-
versations about rights do not depend upon transcendent notions of truth, 
rationality and understanding. Rorty's famous liberal ironist is capable of 
at once using the language of rights as a tool or instrument while knowing 
that this language of rights, like all language, is contingent. The liberal 
ironist knows that his or her vocabulary of rights is fragile and always 
subject to redescription, yet reasons that, at this point in history, the best 
way to respond to this fragility and contingency is to support the liberal 
project of separating the public world of justice from the private world 
of self-creation, the right from the good, and, in the process, the liberal 
'we' from a differentiated 'they'. It is on this latter point that Hoffmann 
departs from Rorty, suggesting that Rorty oversimplifies both the 'we' and 
the 'they', the self and the other. As a result, Rortyan pragmatism could 
only ground 'proactive, cross-cultural human rights activism' if it were 
based upon 'at least discursive, if not political or military hegemony'.72 
Hoffmann views the formalism ofMartti Koskenniemi as offering another 
way through. Koskenniemi's invocation of a culture of formalism which 
allows for an empty universality suggests to Hoffmann that it is possible 'to 
take a position and argue proactively for it- within the formalist frame-
work- while avoiding substantive fixation'. 73 Yet formalism can only offer 
a 'simulacrum for universality' by treating the 'particular language game 
of which it is made up' as a 'placeholder for an unattainable unity'.74 For 
Hoffmann, then, it is possible to be active in the name of human rights 
only by recognizing that there is no objective foundation for action. This 
theory of human rights action accepts 'the multiple validities of human 
rights, and the singular validity of their promotion'.75 Hoffmann thus 
leaves us to consider the conditions of possibility of the 'singular valid-
ity' of human rights promotion, and the related questions of the arrival 
of rights and the nature of the practices by which the facts about rights 
72 Florian F. Hoffmann, 'Human rights, the self and the other: reflections on a pragmatic 
theory of human rights', pp. 221-44 at p. 241. 
73 Ibid., p. 243. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid., p. 226. 
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are 'found' or written.76 In light of this, critical theorists might in future 
attend closely to the genealogy of these material practices which are the 
stuff of the human rights activist. 
Part III: The relation to the other 
The essays in Part III explore the impossible demands made of those 
addressed by international law in its civilizing mode, and the intimate 
quality of the encounter mediated by international law with those figured 
as other. In doing so, these chapters problematize the easy distinction 
between public and private championed by the liberal ironist discussed 
above. They show that international law is bound up with the creation of 
the modern subjeet, suggesting the undecidability of the public/private 
distinction. 77 Where ' [ t] o be at home ... is to have an identity, one based 
on security and permanence that state-produced anxiety and the state-
produced compensation for that anxiety have gone a long way in helping 
create'/8 these chapters make us wonder just who is at home in the world 
produced by civilizing missions and wars on terror. In addition, these 
chapters interrogate the stakes of the claim that law or critique respond 
to, or decide in the name of, the other. As Derrida writes: 
To take a decision in the name of the other in no way at all lightens my 
responsibility, on the contrary ... my responsibility is accused by the fact 
that it is the other in the name of which I decide. 79 
For Liliana Obregon, like Connal Parsley, 'there is no identity, there 
is only identification or self-identification as a process'.8° For Obregon, 
the identity in question is that of the 'community of civilized nations'. 
In the Latin America of the nineteenth century, becoming civilized, or 
completing civilization, was an ongoing process of identification with 
which international law was inextricably tied up. The destination of this 
becoming of the Creole elites of Latin America was a 'civilization' which 
was differentiated from 'Europe', yet still one of its proper heirs. Obregon 
evokes the longing of these elites to be recognized by their European 
counterparts, and the ways in which the letrados or men of letters who 
76 On the arrival of rights, see further Anne Orford, 'Human Rights After Faith' (2006) 7 
Melbourne ]oumal of International Law I. 
77 Derrida, 'Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism', p. 79. 
78 Kristin Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture 
(Cambridge, MA, 1996), p. 107. 
79 Derrida, 'Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism', p. 85. 
80 Jacques Derrida, 'Following Theory' in Michael Payne and john Schad (eds.), 
life. after. theory (London, 2003), pp. 1-51 at p. 25 (emphasis in original). 
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headed up the newly independent nations sought to complete civiliza-
tion in part through participating in and producing international law. 
The post-independence Creoles sought to identify themselves both as 
autonomous from Europe, but 'at the same time they believed themselves 
to be righteous inheritors of a European legal, cultural and intellectual 
legacy'.81 Obregon traces the 'will to civilization' expressed in the writ-
ing of publicists such as the Argentinian Carlos Calvo, the Peruvian 
Manuel Atanasio Fuentes and the Colombian Jose Maria Samper. These 
men struggled in quite different ways 'to participate and be identified 
as part of the civilized world'82 through an engagement with interna-
tional law. Her account suggests the ways in which Europe and North 
America worked as an imagined addressee of many of their writings, 
and the complicated and at times ambivalent ways in which Creole elites 
imagined their relations with their European counterparts. For Fuentes 
and Sam per, European and US interventions in Latin America were to be 
rejected, while the models that Europe and the US offered for appropri-
ating indigenous lands and remedying the nation's needs through laws 
and force were to be adopted. For Calvo, international law was not 'a 
foreign and distant model imposed by Europe, but rather ... part of a 
legal heritage which connected them to Roman law, the backbone of the 
jus gentium, and thus to one of the factors that Europeans acknowledged 
as the origins of "civilization'".83 Her chapter offers a nuanced account 
of the ways in which fantasies of identity organized around civilization 
and barbarism accompanied the arrival of international law in Latin 
America. 
Frederic Megret takes up the themes of civilization, barbarity and inter-
national law to explore a different set of nineteenth-century fantasies. 
Megret suggests that many contemporary international humanitarian 
lawyers would argue that there is no outside to the laws of war, and 
that everyone is brought 'within its protective, hyper-inclusive mantle'.84 
This then generates a particular reading of situations where someone is 
excluded from the protection of international humanitarian law, such as 
the infamous treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay denied prisoner 
of war status by their US captors. While some US lawyers have argued 
that these detainees are properly outside the protection of international 
humanitarian law, this has been responded to with outraged virtue by the 
81 Liliana Obregon, 'Completing civilization: Creole consciousness and international law in 
nineteenth-century Latin America', pp. 247-64 at p. 254. 
82 Ibid., p. 257. 83 Ibid., p. 263. 
84 Frederic Megret, 'From "savages" to "unlawful combatants": a postcolonial look at inter-
national humanitarian law's "other"', pp. 265-317 at p. 265. 
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rest of the international humanitarian law community. However, Megret 
argues that the history of this area of law is grounded upon exclusion -
the figure of an 'other' outside the law 'haunts the very beginnings and 
evolution of the laws of war'. 85 In a detailed survey of the genesis of the 
modern laws of war through to the contemporary era of the war on ter-
ror, Megret traces the exclusion of non-Western peoples from the benefits 
and obligations the law was meant to offer. For Megret, it should not 
be forgotten that the European attempt to 'grapple with the problem of 
violence in war' through codifying the laws of war to govern the dis-
ciplined troops of the nations of Europe took place at the same time 
that Europe was 'unleashing unprecedented violence outside its borders' 
in the scramble for Africa.86 Early international humanitarian lawyers 
were colonialists who often defended the theoretical or practical exclu-
sion of 'non-civilized' peoples from the laws of war. Megret challenges 
the conventional narrative according to which international humanitar-
ian law is making progress towards universal inclusion within the law's 
reach. The tradition of international humanitarian law remains 'neces-
sarily both inclusive and exclusive', in that the attempt to define the cat-
egories of those who are protected 'is necessarily exclusive of something 
if it is to be inclusive of anything'.87 Thus, according to Megret, the US 
lawyers seeking to justify the exclusion of al Qaeda members from the 
protection of international humanitarian law are true to the letter (if 
not the spirit) of that tradition. Megret suggests that we should read 
international humanitarian law not only as a practice that constrains 
and protects (though it plays an important role in doing so), but also 
as a practice that regulates, normalizes, disciplines and projects power. 
Through the project of regulating modern warfare, international law has 
legitimized a particular vision of what it is to be a combatant, what it is 
to be at war, and thus what it is to be a sovereign state. The laws of war 
project a fantasy about what it is to be a subject at war, and by forcing 
non-Western peoples to engage with that fantasy, work as 'instruments 
of forced socialization of non-Western nations into the international 
community'. 88 
The chapter by Dianne Otto also explores the ways in which the other 
has been represented in international law. Her chapter registers an aspect 
of the institutional moment in which international lawyers and feminist 
scholars might understand ourselves. This is a moment in which feminists 
85 Ibid., p. 267. 86 Ibid., p. 270. 
87 Ibid., p. 304 (emphasis omitted). 88 Ibid., p. 308. 
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are having an effect on the theorizing and practices of international law 
and international relations. Feminism, or at least a version of it, is insti-
tutionalized as part of the academic and bureaucratic life of international 
law in the twenty-first century. Yet, as Otto's chapter shows, this emer-
gence of feminists as disciplinary players and policy-makers also produces 
anxiety and melancholy for feminists. Otto asks what it means to incorpo-
rate women into international law, if in so doing the subversive potential 
or erotic charge of differentiation that founded the desire to encounter the 
other is thus erased or domesticated? What happens when a feminist the-
ory which sought persistently to put into question notions of sovereignty, 
authority, mastery and control now seems poised to transmit a new tradi-
tion for which it is (or may be) the sovereign authority? Did feminists mean 
to capture 'woman' and 'gender' as secure identities in suggestions for law 
reform? Otto focuses on the designation of woman as other in the texts 
of international human rights law, and traces the inscription of women 
within these texts from the earliest instruments of the League ofNations, 
shaped by the imperatives of colonialism and the priorities of domestic-
ity and motherhood, through to the present era of instrumentalization 
of women's rights as special or universal human rights. She explores the 
ways in which feminist strategies have been employed over that time 
in attempts to realize the promise of human rights. Otto shows that in 
representing women, and later gender, international law has continued to 
exclude that which is outside its system of representation. Woman as other 
is only ever represented by assimilating her to existing economies and Ian-
guages - as wife and mother in need of protection, as the woman who is 
'formally equal' to man in public life, and as the victim subject in need 
of rescuing. These characters are haunting - they display 'an uncanny 
ability to survive, despite the best efforts of feminist legal strategists'. 89 
Otto attempts to resist the reinscription of these gendered roles and the 
consequent domestication of feminism, yet with a sense of uncertainty 
about whether this is possible. How to recover that which is lost when 
Woman is secured in discourse? In the closing sections of the chapter, 
Otto slips the bonds oflaw, in a celebratory passage which recaptures the 
energy of a movement driven by eros, the desire to encounter the other. In 
those closing pages, identities multiply, new worlds are imagined in which 
'the full range of sex/gender possibilities would be opened to all human 
beings as never before and the dualistic models of gender equality would 
89 Dianne Otto, 'Lost in translation: rescripting the sexed subjects of international human 
rights law', pp. 318-56 at p. 321. 
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be superseded'.90 Yet law and institutions step back in- as Otto says, 'I am 
jumping too far ahead'. To reject gender at this point is to lose 'the concep-
tual tools that are necessary to make legal sense of the "gendered human 
rights facts" of the present'.91 In the present tense of the law, the project 
of feminist disruption of the categories of human rights law 'has barely 
begun'.92 
The naming of the mutilated woman as other in the texts oflaw is the 
subject of the chapter by Juliet Rogers. Rogers explores how and where 
we find the word of international law incarnated, and whose flesh sus-
tains the fantasies ofWestern sovereignty. Rogers focuses on the unprece-
dented enthusiasm with which legislation prohibiting practices described 
as 'female genital mutilation' has been passed during the past two decades 
'in countries we might now call the coalition of the "willing"'.93 For Rogers, 
this laying down of law is an attempt to ally the anxiety that the Western 
subject feels when confronted with the presence of practices 'in dialogue 
with another Other'. 94 Such practices appear to point beyond the sovereign 
authority of the positive law which recognizes the subject as subject- they 
suggest 'the presence of another's law' within the Western state. 'Female 
genital mutilation suggests a limit to the sovereignty of the subject and 
thus calls into question his capacity for Being before the law and for 
articulating the symbolic as "truth'".95 If, as the chapter by Douzinas sug-
gests, the initial secularization of power in Western democracies 'does 
not guarantee openness' and that instead 'the people' has come to sig-
nify 'one further link in the chain of substitutions of the metaphysical 
principle of the One',96 then female genital mutilation threatens to break 
this chain. Female genital mutilation brings the other too close - it is a 
reminder of that which cannot be enclosed, of that which escapes positive 
law. The internationalization of female genital mutilation legislation -
which Rogers refers to as an 'international franchise'- serves to reassure 
the Western subject of his relationship to a 'universal, all-encompassing 
Other'. In the words of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 
'[l]egislation is one of the most obvious forms of the exercise of sovereign 
power'.97 The making of female genital mutilation is the kind of 'frenetic 
legislative activity' which 'attests to the desire for a Father or law-maker'.98 
90 Ibid., p. 355. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 
93 Juliet Rogers, 'Flesh made law: the economics of female genital mutilation legislation', 
pp. 357-86 at p. 357. 
94 Ibid., p. 361. 95 Ibid. 96 Douzinas, 'Speaking law', p. 48. 
97 Eastern Greenland Case (1933) PCIJ Rep (Ser. A/B) No. 53 at 30. 
98 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Oxford, 2000), p. 329. 
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The 'mutilated woman' who appears through this law-making is 'a collec-
tion of symptoms of the Western individual', and enables the reproduction 
'in fantasy, of an ideal subjectivity of the "non-mutilated" subject'.99 Yet 
this reconstituted sovereign authority will continue to be haunted by that 
which it pushes away to secure a self and a community- the reminder of 
'another economy and a relationship with another Other'. 100 
Part IV: History's other actors 
We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And 
while you're studying that reality- judiciously, as you will- we'll act again, 
creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things 
will sort out. We're history's actors ... and you, all of you, will be left to 
just study what we do. 101 
This is the theatre where today's 'native informants' collectively attempt to 
make their own history as they act (in the most robust sense of agency) a 
part they have not chosen, in a script that has as its task to keep them silent 
and invisible. 102 
The chapters in Part IV speak to the questions of agency, responsibility 
and history invoked by the quotes above. The chapters engage with the 
anxious sense of simultaneous importance and irrelevance experienced 
on the part of international lawyers in the context of the unfolding war 
on terror, and the impossibility of determining where law's speech exists 
in relation to the border separating action from inaction. 
In his chapter, Antony Anghie refers to the first of the quotes above, 
the now infamous statement made by one of the advisers to US President 
George W. Bush claiming that the US are 'history's actors'. In this vision, 
history's actors are its victors. To act is to dominate and conquer (or, at 
least, to liberate). Those who criticize such actions are purely reactive, 
left to study the realities brought into being by the creators of history. Yet 
what lies between 'reality' and the student or judge of that reality? What 
is it that 'all of you' will be left to study? This dismissive statement makes 
it seem that history is not written, but rather that it is simply a record of 
what was done (and perhaps said). The writer of history is not a writer. In 
contrast, Anghie argues that it is precisely this question of what it means 
99 Rogers, 'Flesh made law', p. 358. 100 Ibid., p. 386. 
101 Unnamed senior adviser to US President Bush, as quoted in Ron Suskind, 'Without a 
Doubt', New York Times Magazi11e, 17 October 2004, p. 51. 
102 Spivak, Critique of Postcolollial Reason, p. 85. 
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to write critically that is shifting in the 'new reality' of the world post-
11 September 2001. In a beautiful closing passage, Anghie invokes the 
affective power of the word in ways that offer a different understanding 
of the capacity oflanguage to move us. 
For Hilary Charlesworth and David Kennedy, these chapters raise the 
question of what difference international law makes, and how it makes 
difference. How does international law differentiate between itself and 
its others? What do we mean by international law when we ask that 
question? Where do we look to find the others of a law that imagines 
itself as universal? And how does international law participate in mak-
ing difference(s), making a difference to the politics of our time? Rather 
than imagine ourselves as 'wise and sometimes heroic counsellors speak-
ing truth/law to power', Charlesworth and Kennedy urge international 
lawyers and scholars to understand ourselves as 'active participants in 
intensely political and negotiable contexts' and to 'confront [the] respon-
sibility' that this involves 'without sheltering behind the illusion of an 
impartial, objective, legal order'. 103 They focus on the invasion of Iraq as 
the event or the scandal that has put these questions of responsibility and 
relevance at the forefront of public debate in many parts of the world yet 
again. For Charlesworth and Kennedy, if the demand that international 
law reinvent itself and reassert its relevance is always posed in terms of 
its ability to perform as either a formal constraint on, or an instrument 
of, power, law will always be found wanting. Yet to analyse international 
law in these black and white, with us or against us terms paints a picture 
of international law that is limited and misleading. Instead, they suggest 
we should ask what difference did it make that the invasion of Iraq was 
widely criticized as a violation of international law? Why was there so little 
consideration of international law as productive - of how international 
law might have contributed to the production of Iraq as a country that 
was ripe for invasion? How we understand the difference that is made 
by internationalizing Iraq (and to a much lesser extent the US) remains 
an open question. It is at this point that the histories and the legacies of 
international law that are explored in these chapters offer rich lines of 
inquiry. 
The world of international diplomacy and institutions has long been 
haunted by its inability to halt the march of events to their fated con-
clusion. The description by John Maynard Keynes of his experience as a 
103 Hilary Charlesworth and David Kennedy, 'Afterword: and forward - there remains so 
much we do not know', pp. 401-8 at pp. 407-8. 
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negotiator of the Treaty of Peace concluding World War 1 suggests that 
these anxieties are in fact nothing new: 
The proceedings of Paris all had this air of extraordinary importance and 
unimportance at the same time. The decisions seemed charged with conse-
quences to the future of human society; yet the air whispered that the word 
was not flesh, that it was futile, insignificant, of no effect, dissociated from 
events; and one felt most strongly the impression ... of events marching on 
to their fated conclusion uninfluenced and unaffected by the cerebrations 
of Statesmen in Council.104 
International legal scholars fear a double displacement - if the 'cere-
brations of Statesmen in Council' and their international legal advisers 
are no match for fate, the writings of critical scholars about these cerebra-
tions seem even less so. Yet paradoxically it is the death and suffering which 
internationalism seems unable to prevent which also gives to international 
law the air of importance at the same time as suggesting its irrelevance. 
As Keynes reveals, central to this has been the scene of writing and its 
relationship to fate and death - 'the air whispered that the word was not 
flesh'. Maybe it should come as no surprise that the events of World War 
1 and their challenge to the self-image of European civilization should 
also have been experienced by Keynes as a challenge to the Christian 
philosophy of reading - 'the idea of the Book that comes to life, of the 
letter that delivers its spirit by the action of a body'. 105 In the aftermath 
of this war, was it still possible to imagine the world in terms of 'a sort of 
human theatre where speech [parole] becomes action, takes possession of 
souls, leads bodies and gives rhythm to their walk'?106 The contemporary 
anxiety about the capacity to understand international law in terms of 
its relationship to action might be read as one form of working through 
the 'accumulation of death' which marked the inter-war period of which 
Keynes writes, and which haunts this time of terror. 107 At stake in the 
disciplinary preoccupation with the relevance of the speech of interna-
tionallaw to a world of war, blood, debt and suffering is this relationship 
between word and flesh. Should we understand the relationship between 
word and action only in terms of 'the letter that delivers its spirit by the 
104 John Maynard Keynes, 'The Economic Consequences of the Peace' in The End ofLaissez-
Faire!The Economic Consequences of the Peace (Amherst, 2004), pp. 47-298 at p. 56. 
105 Jacques Ranciere, The Flesh of Words, The Politics of Writing (trans. Charlotte Mandell, 
Stanford, 2004), p. 72. 
106 Ibid., p. 4. 
107 On the 'accumulation of death' in the inter-war period, see Rose, On Not Being Able to 
Sleep, p. 88. 
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action of a body'? 108 Should we measure the effectiveness of international 
law through its ability to move the powerful to action or constrain and 
regulate their behaviour? Is there any other way to think about 'the theatre 
of relationships between the text and what's outside, between writing and 
the politics it establishes'? 109 In the second of the quotes above, Gayatri 
Spivak offers a more chastened view of this 'theatre of relationships'. She 
reminds her readers of what it is to be an agent of history for many within 
a global system organized in the ways these chapters describe. She reminds 
us that history's actors may not have chosen their parts, and yet have to 
play them even as they attempt to make their own history. 
Or should we understand legal scholars and their ilk to be the true 
actors of history, the masters of the word who, like Foucault's annalists, 
memorialize the characters of king and presidents and shape the worlds 
of their readers? In response to the imperialist as shaper of reality, it is 
tempting to posit the writer as master of the text of history. Yet, while the 
chapters gathered here argue that to write is to bear responsibility, this is 
not to say that we control the destiny of the texts which we author. This 
sense of the uncertain character of the address of law emerged from the 
closing session of the conference at which these papers were presented. 
This session saw a discussion of the striking proliferation of open letters 
to heads of state which marked the practice of international lawyers seek-
ing to register public dissent about the invasion of Iraq. One such open 
letter to the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, published in the Guardian 
newspaper, later formed the basis of a reflective piece on critical prac-
tice and international law published in the aftermath of the invasion. 110 
Those invited to sign this letter were affiliated with 'three elite universi-
ties - Cambridge, London, and Oxford'. 111 In the closing session of the 
conference, a lively debate ensued around this practice of letter-writing. 
Those scholars who positioned themselves as outsiders to the discipline 
of international law expressed their incredulity at the thought of writing 
letters to prime ministers or heads of state, and explained that they had a 
more tenuous relationship to power. Other critical international lawyers 
described their feeling of depression when these letters began to appear 
and circulate. They saw it as a major setback for the critical international 
legal project that the invasion of Iraq was popularly discussed as illegal 
(as if somehow law were not involved in producing 'Iraq the problem'). 
108 Ranciere, Flesh of Words, p. 72. 109 Ibid., p. 129. 
110 Matthew Craven, Susan Marks, Gerry Simpson and Ralph Wilde, 'We Are Teachers of 
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As the discussion evolved, the question of the addressees of such letters 
became more complicated. Indeed, one reply to the English letter came 
from a scholar at 'a "new" (former polytechnic) university in London', who 
wrote to its authors asking why those 'from a broader range of institutions 
were not asked to sign'. 112 To whom are our acts as speaking subjects of 
law addressed? How can we be sure? 
It is this image of the open letter, and the complicated question of its 
addressees, with which I will conclude. Perhaps we might think of the 
writing of international law as an open letter, or a postcard, which sets off 
'to travel the world without a father to guarantee the discourse, and will 
turn right and turn left without knowing to whom it should and should 
not speak'. 113 In The Post Card, Derrida explores this 'impossibility that 
a unique addressee ever be identified, or a destination either'. 114 It is this 
that makes speech 'the true realm of eroticism' (rather than a means of 
access to that realm). Although there is no destination and no addressee, 
we keep trying 'to touch each other with words'. 115 Law's speech and the 
words of the critic are on their way to an encounter that lies ahead. Their 
promise lies in the impossibility of knowing to whom they will speak 
upon their travels. 
112 Ibid. 113 Ranciere, Flesh of Words, p. 92. 
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